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I.

Introduction

For several years, space transportation system and architecture (the
total set of space transportation launch and support systems) studies have
been underway having as a principal focus a substantial reduction in recurring
and life cycle costs. Cost reductions are essential if the nation is to
economically handle the substantially increased space traffic levels projected
for the mid-1990s and beyond. However, in the aftermath of the Challenger
tragedy it became apparent that there was another factor which also needed
emphasis — that of architecture and system resiliency, the ability to readily
The long post-failure standdown time which the
recover from misfortune.
Shuttle has experienced clearly illustrates the implications of a lack of
resiliency. Among these are: severe schedule delays; an inability to fly
critical or time-dependent payloads; and substantial costs imposed on all
programs for payload storage and maintenance, facilities maintenance, reduced
productivity, and personnel.
In the fall of 1986, studies were initiated at The Aerospace
Corporation on the issue of space transportation architecture and systems
resiliency. The objectives were fourfold, namely:
o
o
o
o

to define a systematic approach for quantitatively analyzing
systems/architecture resiliency
to identify those parameters which determine resiliency and to
understand their quantitative interaction
to evaluate the resiliency of the presently-planned U. S. space
transportation architecture in the context of projected national
space traffic
to identify means for improving resiliency.

The fundamental
work, has been
communities, as
space program
presentations.

analysis effort was completed by March 1987. Since then, the
presented to high levels within the Air Force, NASA, and SDIO
well as to other government organizations concerned with U. S.
This paper documents the substance of those
activities.

Before commencing with a discussion of the analytical work, it is noted
that from the outset it was recognized that the analysis was not only dealing
with resiliency, but rather with the more general subject of operability.
Operability includes several factors:
o
o
o
o

resiliency — the ability to readily recover from misfortune
availability — the fraction of time that a system is in an
operational, rather than a post-failure standdown state
reliability — the probability that a launch system will fulfill
its cargo delivery mission without any standdown-causing failures
dependability — the ability of an operational launch system to
maintain flight schedules.
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The first three operability factors are closely related. The fourth
factor, dependability, is more a function of the ability to realize small
uncertainties in ground operations timelines and to have a system with broad
weather operating envelopes. The issue of how to achieve high dependability
is being pursued in other activities, and will not be discussed further.
II.

Analytical Model & Parametrics

When a launch system experiences an in-flight failure, there is
generally a post-failure standdown period sufficiently long to allow for
failure diagnosis, the implementation of any needed design or procedural
changes, and validation of changes through appropriate analysis and/or
testing. Subsequently, a period of increased launch rate (surge) would be
needed if a payload backlog has accumulated during the standdown and is to be
eliminated. During this surge period, payloads from the standdown period
would be sequenced with new payloads in a priority order. Upon backlog
elimination, the launch system would return to its prefailure (normal) launch
rate.
This sequence of events comprises the analytical model for the
resiliency analysis (see Figure 1).
The duration of the surge period is a function of the post-failure
standdown time, the surge launch rate, and the fraction of payloads originally
scheduled to be flown during the standdown interval which constitute the
payload backlog.
The number of launches involved in the surge period is
dependent upon these parameters as well as the pre-failure (normal) launch
rate. For very short standdown times, all originally planned payloads would
probably still be flown; a backlog fraction of approximately 1.0. For longer
standdown times, it is likely that the backlog fraction would decrease as
launch windows are missed, needs for time-dependent missions are negated, and
payload programs and budgets are redefined.
There
are very limited data,
stemming principally from the
post-Challenger situation, upon which to base the backlog fraction parameter.
An examination of pre-Challenger and post-Challenger manifests planned for
U.S. launch systems was conducted at a time when the Shuttle standdown was
being projected to be about 24 months. Some of the payloads eliminated from
the manifests were not very firm payloads, and others were eliminated due to
programmatic changes seemingly independent of the Shuttle standdown. However,
a substantial number were apparently eliminated because of the lengthy
anticipated Shuttle standdown. Based upon this analysis, a payload backlog
fraction decrease of 0.167 per year of standdown time was assumed.
Using the analytical model, a quantitative resiliency parameter has
been defined, namely the probability that a launch system can recover from the
effects of a failure, including backlog elimination, before suffering another
failure (i.e. the probability of proceeding through the surge period without
any failures). It is a function of the number of launches involved in the
surge and the probability of a successful flight (without any failure which
would cause a standdown), the launch system's reliability.
The equation for the resiliency parameter is:
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where PS = probability of no failures during surge period
= launch system's reliability
r
= numbers of launches during surge period
N
= normal (pre-failure) launch rate, ///year
R
Tj) = launch system's characteristic post-failure standdown time,
years
= backlog fraction
K
= launch rate surge factor (i.e. surge launch rate divided by
S
normal launch rate)
Obviously, a high value of Ps , the resiliency parameter, would be
desirable. The issue is: "What value of Ps would represent an acceptable
resiliency criterion, or, equivalently, what probability of one-or-more
To answer this, the
failures, PF = 1 -Ps , would be tolerable?"
implications of a surge period failure need be understood.
If a (second) failure occurred during the more densely trafficked surge
period, there would be a greater backlog created by the ensuing standdown.
The subsequent surge period would be longer in duration than the original
surge period would have been (if completed) because of the bigger backlog, and
would involve more launches. The probability of a failure during the new surge
period would be even greater than during the original surge period.
To provide high confidence that a launch system could reachieve a
normal situation within a reasonable time frame, the resiliency analysis set
as a criterion that given a failure during the first surge period, there would
be at least a 0.5 probability of no failures during the second surge period.
This requires a success probability, Pg of at least 0.65 during the original
surge period, or a failure probability, Pp, of no more than 0.35. From the
form of the resiliency parameter equation, higher values of P§ may be
achieved by increasing reliability, decreasing post-failure standdown times,
increasing the launch system's surge capability, or decreasing the normal
For given levels of reliability, standdown time, and surge
launch rate.
capability the attainment of a desired value of Ps would require a
limitation of the normal launch rate, R.
illustrating the influences of the various resiliency
Before
determinants, attention will be given to the matter of launch system
availability. Figure 2 illustrates the effects of changing system reliability
on system availability and other operating parameters. In the uppermost line
of Figure 2, the post-failure scenario is depicted with a next failure
presumed to occur after the average number of flights between failures
(1/1-r). Note that the operational part of the cycle between failures is made
up of a surge period and a normal launch rate period. The launch system
operational availability is defined as the operational time divided by the
total cycle time (i.e. sum of the operational and standdown times).
In the second line of Figure 2, a launch system having a somewhat lower
reliability is presumed. Its second failure occurs, on average, after a fewer
number of flights with the result being a lower operational availability and a
higher percentage of the operational time spent in surge. A still lower
reliability (third line of Figure 2) could cause failures to occur (on
average) just at the end of the surge period. In such a situation, the system
would always be surging to keep up with demand, a poor way to operate any
system. Any lesser reliability would not allow the launch system to keep up
with demand.
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Figure 3 illustrates launch system availability and resiliency
relationships, assuming a system with a characteristic post-failure standdown
time of 6 months and a launch rate surge capability of 1.5. For a given
annual launch rate, as reliability decreases availability decreases and
ultimately, if reliability gets sufficiently low, the cross-hatched line is
reached at which the system would be always in a surge condition. Below that
line the system could not handle the demand. Along that line, there is a 64%
chance of having a surge period failure, clearly well in excess of the
criterion for resiliency (35% or less).
The dashed line in Figure 3 is the locus of points which just meet the
resiliency criterion (P$ = 0.65; Pp = 0.35).
This line falls about
halfway (on the availability scale) between the cross-hatched barrier and
perfection (i.e. reliability = 1.0, availability = 1.0). Along the Pp =
0.35 line, operational availability is approximately 0.85 for the particular
standdown and surge parameters assumed. A system which achieves resiliency
with reasonable surge rates is inherently an available system.
Figure 4 depicts allowable annual launch rates, R, if systems are to
just meet the resiliency criterion of Pp = 0.35, PS = 0.65. Two graphs
are presented: the left hand one for a surge factor of 1.25, and the right
hand one for a surge factor of 1.50. It may be seen that an increase from
1.25 to 1.5 in the surge factor could allow a 66% increase in launch rate.
(Surge capabilities much beyond about 50% might be difficult to achieve
because of practical facility and personnel limits). A decrease in standdown
time from 6 months to 3 months could allow an increase in launch rate of
almost 100%. However, unless there is a willingness, perhaps imprudent, to
count on realizing very high reliabilities and very short standdown times,
Figure 4 would indicate an incompatibility between resiliency and very high
use rates for a single launch system.
Launch rate surge capability is a necessary ingredient for resiliency.
However, surge capability is perhaps a misnomer, for surge implies a
short-lived action. Quite to the contrary, a launch system's post-standdown
surge period would be quite lengthy (e.g. 1 1/2 years for a 6-month standdown
and a surge capability of 1.33). This must be recognized in defining a system
configuration, including its facilities and personnel requirements.
Achieving a surge capability involves some different considerations
depending upon whether a launch system involves an expendable vehicle or a
vehicle having major reusable elements (e.g. the Shuttle orbiter).
With
expendable vehicles, production generally continues during a post-failure
standdown period, with the vehicles being accumulated for the surge. Surge
capabilities are a function of processing/launch facilities, ground operations
concepts, and personnel levels.
In a system involving vehicles having a major reusable element(s), the
maximum launch rate attainable is also a function of the number of reusable
elements available and the maximum number of times per year that each may be
flown. Therefore, if a system involving reusable elements is to be capable of
surging, each reusable element must be utilized at less than its allowable
utilization rate) during normal operations. As can be seen in Figure 5, the
extent of this underutilization must be larger if it is expected that a
replacement reusable element(s) will not be available at commencement of surge
operations.
If a replacement vehicle is assumed to be available, the
pre-failure capacity utilization fraction is simply 1/S, or 0.67 for a 50%

8-4

surge capability (i.e. if a simple reusable vehicle can be used six times per
year maximum, then its normally planned utilization should be only four times
per year to provide a reserve for achieving a 50% surge). If a replacement
vehicle were not to be available, than the required pre-failure utilization
rate of each reusable vehicle should be further limited to permit the same
surge capability with one less vehicle in the fleet. These considerations
very significantly affect on the economics of reusable vehicles for cargo
transport.
There is a special case when no surge is needed because there is no
backlog resulting from a post-failure standdown. This situation could arise
if, for example, the launch system was used only for space station crew
rotation, because a higher rotation frequency would not be required after a
standdown. With no surge requirement, the resiliency parameter does not
Figure 6 plots
apply, though system availability is still important.
availability for the no backlog, no surge case as a function of system
reliability, characteristic post-failure standdown time, and launch rate.
Again it can be observed that maintaining good availability at high launch
rates requires an appropriate combination of high reliability and low
post-failure standdown times.
III.

Resiliency Analysis of U.S. Space Transportation Architecture

If a space transportation architecture is to have good resiliency
characteristics, then so must each of its component launch systems. This
means that each launch system must be operated at a rate no higher than can be
justified (using the resiliency criterion, or availability for the special
case) by its reliability, characteristic post-failure standdown time, and
surge capability. However, this implies that a specific set of launch systems
can only accommodate a limited total mass rate to orbit. As a result, there
is a question of how the present U.S. space transportation architecture
(Shuttle, Titan IV, Delta II, and Titan II) measures up on a resiliency basis
considering possible future space traffic demands.
To address this question, the present architecture was first examined
in the context of the budget constrained national mission model used in the
recent DoD/NASA Space Transportation Architecture Study. This mission model,
summarized in Figure 7 predicates a mass rate to low earth orbit (due east
equivalents) in the post-1995 time period of approximately 1,000,000 pounds
per year, including tha weight of upper stages for those payloads having
Figure 7 also delineates a
destinations beyond low earth orbit.
representative manifest for handling this traffic, namely 12 Shuttle, 8 Titan
IV, 14 Delta II and 3 Titan II flights per year.
To analyze the architecture resiliency, values must be assigned for the
reliability and post-failure standdown times of each component system. Figure
8 presents reliability and downtime histories for various contemporary launch
systems. A quick perusal indicates that, with the exception of Scout and
Ariane, the reliability of contemporary expendables is about 94 to 95
percent. For the resiliency analysis, values of 96% will be used for Delta II
and Titan IV, reflecting some assumed growth in reliability from their
forerunners. For the Shuttle, the demonstrated reliability of 0.96 is not
statistically meaningful since the cause of the Challenger failure has been
attributed to a design deficiency aggregated by the decision to launch^during
extremely cold weather. For the resiliency analysis, Shuttle will be assumed
to have at least a 98% reliability.
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Standdown time experience for contemporary vehicles is also presented,
in Figure 8. For the expendables, average standdown times range from slightly
under 3 to slightly over 5 months (6.3 months if the latest Titan standdown is
added to the data). The average standdown time seems to grow with increasing
vehicle size. This could be due to a number of things; e.g. the higher value
of payloads launched aboard the larger vehicles requiring additional
confidence before resumption of operations, or larger vehicles involving more
diagnostics, redesign and retest .complexity.
Alternatively, the downtime
differences, may not be size related but due to operating procedure/decision
criteria differences between operating agencies (DoD, NASA).
For the
resiliency analysis characteristic standdown times of 4 months and 6 months
were assumed for Delta II and Titan IV, respectively.
For Shuttle, the present 30-plus month standdown was not considered
characteristic due to the nature of the failure which caused the Challenger
loss. A range of 12 to 18 months for the characteristic standdown time was
examined for Shuttle. The chbice of these standdown times reflects a belief
that characteristic standdown times will be longer for vehicles having major
reusable elements, be they manned or unmanned vehicles, than for expendables.
This is because of the value of such vehicles and the fact that reusable
vehicle fleet sites are small. Great confidence in the probability of success
is generally required to risk the launch of a reusable vehicle.
With reliability and standdown times assigned, the resiliency parameter
(the probability of failure during a surge period following a post-failure
standdown) was calculated for each vehicle in the architecture. The results
are presented in Figure 9.
Calculations were performed for two different
values of surge capability, except in the case of Shuttle where computations
were done only for a surge factor of 1.25. As indicated in the figure, a
surge factor of 1.5 for Shuttle over a flight rate of 12 per year would
require a pre-failure fleet size of 6 Orbiters, assuming a replacement vehicle
was not available at surge commencement following a failure — such a fleet
size is not contemplated for Shuttle.
The data in Figure 9 indicate that, with the exception of Titan II
operating at a low launch rate of 3 per year, all of the vehicles fail to meet
the resiliency criterion of Pp equal to or less than 0.35.
In some cases
the Pp values are within 0.1 of the criterion value. However in other
cases, (e.g. the Shuttle with 0.98 reliability) the Pp values are very much
too high, sometimes equaling or exceeding the Pp value of approximately 0.64
at which a system would always be surging and just barely able to meet
demand. In summary, the four vehicle architecture is inadequate for handling
the budget constrained mission model traffic since required vehicle launch
rates would be too high to provide good operability (resiliency/availability) .
The most pronounced problem seems to be with the Shuttle, since a
flight rate of 12 per year would require v the assumption of either very high
reliability (greater than 0.99) or shorter standdown times. To bank on these
might be imprudent since excessive aggregate standdowns times and backlog
buildups could result if the expectations are unrealized. Current national
policy is emphasizing Shuttle use only for missions requiring the transport of
man or man's involvement in on-orbit payload operations other than just
deployment. This could bring Shuttle flight rates down to more acceptable
values.
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However, just offloading Shuttle is not a satisfactory solution,
because the additional traffic cannot be handled by the other vehicles. The
data of Figure 9 shows that the assumed Titan IV and Delta II flight rates are
The Titan II payload
already marginal from a resiliency perspective.
capability is too small to offer any significant help in shuttle offloading.
Therefore the only solution appeared to be to add another vehicle to the
A heavylift launch vehicle (HLLV) was assumed as the new
architecture.
vehicle with a payload capability of 100,000 pounds, considered necessary to
accommodate the mission model traffic rate without too high a flight rate.
Figure 10 presents the results of the resiliency analysis for the new
5-vehicle architecture. For this case, the Shuttle, Titan IV and Delta II
flight rates were lowered to 8, 5 and 8, respectively, and supplemented with 5
flights per year of the new heavylift vehicle. If a surge capability of 1.5
is assumed, each of the vehicles can readily handle its traffic load while
meeting the resiliency criterion (except for the pessimistic case where 0.98
and 18 months were assumed for the Shuttle reliability and characteristic
standdown time, respectively). If the lower Shuttle flight rate reflected its
utilization only for manned transport (e.g. space station crew rotation),
then, as previously discussed, Shuttle could require no post-standdown surge.
This possible situation has been analyzed, and the results are presented in
Figure 11. The resiliency parameters (Pp), shown only for the expendables
in this figure, are the same as those in Figure 10. Availability numbers are,
however, presented for all of the systems in Figure 11. With the exception of
a Shuttle with an assumed reliability of 0.98, all of the availability numbers
are 0.9 or better.
In summary, the 5-vehicle architecture with a new heavylift vehicle
appears more than capable of handling the budget constrained mission model.
This is fortunate since growth in the mission model (still not assuming an SDI
deployment or major new civil space initiatives) might be the case as was
postulated in the recent DoD/NASA Space Transportation Architecture Study
(STAS). An analysis of the incremental traffic associated with the STAS
growth model indicates that its principal impact would be an increase in the
HLLV flight rate. Approximately 12 additional HLLV flights would be required
(for a total of 17), depending on realistically realizable load factors. To
accommodate this, the HLLV reliability would have to* be somewhat over 0.98. A
reduction in the HLLV standdown time from the assumed value of 6 months could
permit somewhat higher flight rates.
Figure 12 introduces a note of caution against very optimistic
expectations of high reliability (and/or low standdown times). It illustrates
that if flight rates are set to just meet the resiliency criterion based upon
such expectations, slight reductions in realized reliability result in rapid
increases of the PF parameter to the point where the system could no longer
Exercising prudence is important in making
handle the traffic demand.
reliability and standdown time projections for purposes of determining
allowable flight rates, particularly in the initial years of a new system's
operation until sufficient reliability data is developed.
IV.

Summary

If a space transportation architecture is to have good operability
(resiliency, availability) characteristics, then it must consist of a mixed
fleet of independent launch systems. (An independent launch system is one
which would not be caused to standdown due to a failure in another.) Never
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again can the Nation opt for a one-vehicle architecture, or one in which the
vast preponderance of the traffic is assigned to one vehicle system. In such
situations the frequency and consequences of failures (and failures will
occur) would be intolerable, namely, too often an inability to launch, payload
backlog buildups, and additional costs imposed on many programs because of the
standdowns. Rather, the number of independent systems in the mixed fleet must
be determined, and the architecture operated, such that each system is not
used excessively in relation to its demonstrated or conservatively projected
reliability and standdown times. Furthermore, each system used for cargo
transport must have substantial surgie capability.
For contemporary launch systems,
the resiliency analysis has
illustrated the impracticality of trying to fly Shuttle more than about 8
times per year in view of the projected 12 to 18 month average post-failure
standdown times which likely will characterize that system. Similarly, the
resiliency analysis has shown that Titan IV and Delta II utilizations should
be limited to about 8 and 10 flights per year, respectively, assuming that
these systems achieve only modest improvements in reliability from
contemporary experience and comparable post-failure standdown times.
This leads to the key conclusions of the resiliency analysis, namely:
o
o

there is a need to improve the operability of the U.S. space
transportation architecture if we are to meet future needs; and
to fulfill this need a new heavylift launch vehicle (HLLV) must be
added to the architecture, its specific payload capability to be
determined based on more precise mission requirements and cost
analyses.

The resiliency analysis has illustrated the importance of striving for
improved reliability and reduced standdown times in a new HLLV to facilitate
increased launch rates, to improve economics, and to avoid the loss of costly
critical payloads. If short standdown times (e.g. 4 to 6 months) typical of
present expendables are projected, a HLLV reliability of approximately 0.98 (a
factor of 2 to 3 reduction in future rates from present experience) would be
needed to accommodate projected traffic. However, if the HLLV characteristic
standdown time was much longer (e.g. 1 year or more), substantially higher
reliabilities (greater than 0.99) would be needed. This would likely be the
case with HLLVs having major reusable elements because of their complexity,
cost, and limited numbers. A need for very high reliability is central to the
concept of reusability not only for resiliency, but also to have a low
probability of losing a costly reusable vehicle.
The need for a new HLLV is independent of space transportation cost
reduction considerations. Even if costs were zero for contemporary systems, a
new HLLV would be needed, for architecture operability (availability,
resiliency). However, in adding a new HLLV to the U.S. space transportation
architecture, an opportunity exists to achieve substantial cost reduction.
But seizing upon this opportunity requires a new, revolutionary philosophy in
which design approaches (including design and operating margins), operations
concepts, and technology applications would be selected based on their ability
for cost reduction rather than performance optimization. The Advanced Launch
System (ALS), presently in a concept definition phase under joint Air Force
and NASA program management, has adopted this cost-reduction philosophy. If
developed, ALS could fulfill the operability-based need for a new heavylift
launch system.
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Fig. 11. Resiliency/Availability Analysis for
Constrained Mission Model and 5 Vehicle
Architecture with No Shuttle Backlog or Surge(1)
(1) Shuttle principal use for crew rotation
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